While Egypt celebrated the start of Hosni Mubarak and one wonders what will be the new government of that country, a debate around the "model" of Turkish democratization continues to deepen. February 1, breaking the silence he had observed during the early development of the Egyptian Revolution, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not only supported the demonstrators' demands, but also felt that the Turkish experience could serve as a "model" movement underway in the Arab world, a surprising opinion, because until then the leaders of the AKP had very careful not to set an example, despite the capital of sympathy that they have recently accumulated in the Arab world. Confirming this position, the next day while he was on official visit to Kyrgyzstan, the Turkish prime minister, a few days later, nevertheless tempered, saying he did not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries.
However, these official positions was amplified highlighted the "model" of Turkey, which had already begun to make headlines for several weeks, including Turkey. They occurred moreover at a time when the Turkish think tank TESEV published the results of a survey credence to the idea that the Turkish experience could serve as an example. The authors of that study, conducted between August 25 and September 27 last, from 2267 people in seven Arab countries (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Palestinian territories), as well as Iran, 66% of respondents felt that Turkey was an example of a successful marriage of Islam with democracy, and could serve as an example for countries Middle East. We observe also that respondents agree to more than 70%, to say that the role of Turkey in the Middle East has recently increased, and to wish that this country plays a larger role in the region, particularly in that it assumes the mediation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are the Muslim culture, its economy, its democratic government and its support to Palestinians and Muslims, who are pushing those consulted see a "model". However, its secular system, religious practice less assiduous than elsewhere, and its links with the West, which appeared formerly the characters often touted Turkey in the Muslim world, are now perceived as factors that tend to disqualify the "model" of Turkey.
The authors of this survey also point out that Turkey has gained a significant degree of sympathy among its Muslim Arab neighbors, even if one has long lived on the belief that Turks and Arabs did not like much . Without going back to the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916, including these authors recall that in 2002, a survey conducted by a major U.S. company, showed that Turkey was then one of the most unpopular in the Middle East. They attribute the reversal of opinion indicated by their investigation to the changes that occurred in the Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of the AKP, including significant attention to Turkey's stated respect of its Arab neighbors in recent years, but they also insist on the new capacity of the latter to behave as a true "soft power" in the Middle East, citing the intensification of political cooperation of Turkish diplomacy, and also growth of the cultural influence of this country (success including winning the Turkish TV soap operas in the entire Arab world).
The reasons for this "turcomania" must nevertheless be viewed with caution as they probably reflect more of the good image acquired by Turkey in the Middle East because of its new foreign policy and attitude towards Israel, as an ability to truly be a "model" of democracy for countries in the region. Democracy and the rule of law are also to hone in Turkey. Despite reforms and political changes profound achievements in recent years, the impasse has led in recent months the draft political resolution of the Kurdish question, the blockages that are currently affecting the trial of the murderers of journalist Hrant Dink and the difficulties encountered trying to lift some taboos in Turkish history, ancient (Armenian genocide) or much younger (dirty war against Kurdish rebels in the 90s), should encourage developers official "Turkish model" to be modest.
However, it is true that the transition is being lead Turkey to a system stripped of a military hold heavy after having "digested" political Islam, is an experience likely to think, if only to avoid making comparisons a bit hasty in trying to find ready-made solutions, we take the trouble to understand what the specificity of the political process.
Regarding first demilitarization, it must be remembered that the influence of the army as it was known in the Turkish political system after the first coup in 1960, does not the natural continuation of a trend dating back to the Young Turk revolution and the founding de la République par Mustafa Kemal. À l’époque kémaliste, l’armée, en tant que telle, a été relativement peu impliquée et influente dans le processus de décision politique. En réalité, c’est surtout lorsque, dans les années 1950, un gouvernement civil, élu démocratiquement, a commencé à contester la place dominante et les privilèges des élites kémalistes (dont faisaient partie les militaires), que l’armée à commencer à s’ingérer dans le fonctionnement d’un régime politique qui était alors en cours de démocratisation et à essayer d’en prendre le contrôle. Après deux coups State (1960, 1971), the regime of the 1982 Constitution, the result of a third coup, the 1980, allowed the inclusion of this militarized pluralist parliamentary system, making the army's major political player. Until the 2000s, the actor has managed to ensure sustainability of the system without having to leave their barracks, by simply maintaining the political balance to secure its own interests, and away from power and repress political forces he rejected (Islamist, Kurdish political parties in particular ...)
The questioning of the constitutional regime militarized resulted from the arrival to power in 2002 the AKP, a political force after the Turkish Islamist movement, but does not claim more than Islamism. The success of this key actor of the change stems from the fact that, while having managed to retain much of the Islamist electorate, he managed to capture for its own influence available to the parties of the center-right conservatives who had held Since the 50s, a central place in the government of Turkey, while obtaining the support of intellectuals and various political actors who, frustrated by the inaction of the militarized system, aspired to break the infernal alternative "military or Islamist." When we come together to question the reasons behind the Turkish Islamists have managed to become the vehicle for unlocking the system, unless the ideological and religious factors, it should probably focus on the consideration of their ability to fit into a parliamentary system through regular, despite the military coups, elections not rigged, and leaving room for an active political life at national and local levels. Turkish Islamists have probably begun to be changed by the system before contributing to the change.
What teaches us especially the Turkish experience is that in a system of controlled democracy, the military, under pressure from a power legitimized by a genuine electoral process, may agree to surrender its dominant position to comply gradually with the authority of a civilian government, and a parallel Islamist party, considered the main risk for this system, may become the manager, while working to transform, including him to uphold the principles which he claimed but failed to fully satisfy them (democracy, rule of law). But we must remember that experience, we are talking about is not yet complete, and is also the result of the profound changes have been those of society and the Turkish economy over the last three decades (development of a middle class and civil society in particular). Therefore, if the Turkish transition is not without interest for the Egyptians who currently celebrating the start of Hosni Mubarak and the prospects that it finally opens to a country exhausted by 30 years an autocracy that seemed unchangeable, it is certain they will also invent their own transition to a regime that we hope as democratic as possible.
JM
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